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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This reply brief is necessary to address the State's erroneous characterizations 
of Appellant's arguments, the State's omissions of relevant and contrary portions of the 
cases it cites, and to point out the State's lack of argument in opposition to the actual 
issues raised in the Appellant's Brief. 
A further description of the Nature of the Case is set forth in Appellant's Brief, 
and need not be repeated but is incorporated herein by reference. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Hughes's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Has the State misunderstood Mr. Hughes' argument that his Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel during a psychosexual evaluation 
includes the right to the presence of counsel? 
2. Is the State incorrect in its assertion that the suppression of at least the 
polygraph results, and maybe the psychosexual, would involve a "novel theory" 
of law because, it claims, Mr. Hughes was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior 
to the polygraph examination? 
3. Does the State confuse the distinction between the issues of asking for a 
different evaluation at sentencing and obtaining a confidential evaluation that is 
not disclosed prior to sentencing? 
4. Does the State's claim that Mr. Hughes has not established a prima facie claim of 




The State Misunderstood Mr. Hughes' Argument That His Sixth Amendment Right To 
The Effective Assistance Of Counsel During A Psvchosexual Evaluation Includes 
The Right To The Presence Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Although the state characterizes Idaho's psychosexual evaluation as analogous 
to a competency hearing or a hearing at which the defendant has put his mental status 
at issue, that comparison is unavailing as the comparison is not between two similar 
items. Additionally, the State has failed to acknowledge or apply the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.23d 833 (2006) that a 
psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage of the proceedings. 
B. The State Misunderstood Mr. Hughes' Argument That His Sixth Amendment 
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel During A Psvchosexual Evaluation 
Includes The Right To The Presence Of Counsel 
The State understands Mr. Hughes argument to be that the Estrada Court 
implicitly found a right to the presence of counsel during a psychosexual evaluation. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, Mr. Hughes never claimed that the Estrada Court 
"implicitly held" there was a Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at a 
psychosexual evaluation. Mr. Hughes argued that what the Estrada Court implicitly held 
was that the psychosexual evaluation constituted a critical stage of the proceedings. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10, "The acknowledgement of the client's Sixth Amendment right is 
recognition that this period of the prosecution is a critical stage and as such, the client 
has the protection of the Sixth Amendment during this critical stage.") 
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Mr. Hughes never asserted that "the Court in Estrada 'implicitly held' that the right to 
counsel includes the right to the presence of counsel.' (Respondent's brief, p.8, citing 
Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) Instead, what Mr. Hughes actually argued was that, 
The Estrada Court implicitly held that the psychosexual evaluation was a 
critical stage because, "[l]f the stage is not critical, there can be no 
constitutional violation no matter how deficient counsel's performance." In 
finding a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation, the Estrada Court 
necessarily found that the time period in which the psychosexual 
evaluation occurred was a critical stage. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12, citing Estrada, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 143 P.3d 833, 839 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted)). Thus, Mr. Hughes' argument is not based on the premise 
that this Court has already implicitly decided the right to the presence of counsel issue. 
Because of the State's misunderstanding of Hughes' argument, the State incorrectly 
focuses on whether the psychosexual evaluation constitutes a critical stage and does 
not address the scope of the right to counsel or the meaning of the "assistance" of 
counsel. Further, by relying on federal cases that hold there is no right to the presence 
of counsel during a presentence interview, (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10,) the State fails 
to recognize the Estrada Court has already explicitly held that one is entitled to at least 
the assistance of counsel during the psychosexual evaluation, thus implicitly finding that 
stage to be critical. 
C. Because The State Has Failed To Acknowledge The Holding Of Estrada That 
The Psychosexuaf Evalatuion ls A Critical Stage, The State Has Failed To 
Address The Resulting Impact Of The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel 
In addressing Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not being present during the psychosexual evaluation, the State has 
incorrectly understood Mr. Hughes' argument. Mr. Hughes does not allege that the right 
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to the presence of counsel was implicitly recognized in Estrada. Rather, he asserts that 
Estrada implicitly recognized that the psychosexual evaluation was a critical stage of the 
proceedings. As a corollary to this finding, he asks this Court to now find that because 
this is a critical stage, Mr. Hughes was entitled to the assistance of counsel, including 
the presence of counsel. 
As the Court in Estrada implicitly held, the psychosexual evaluation constitutes a 
critical stage, entitling Mr. Hughes to the assistance of counsel. Because federal courts 
have not defined the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) as a critical 
stage, the cases cited by the State do not define the scope of the right to counsel at a 
critical stage nor define the meaning of "assistance" of counsel. They are, therefore, 
irrelevant to the determination of the issues before the court in this case. 
D. The State Appears To Have Incorrectly Understood Mr. Hughes' Claim To Be 
That He Is Entiled To The Presence Of Counsel In All Psychological Evaluations 
In addressing Mr. Hughes' claim the State also appears to have incorrectly 
understood Mr. Hughes' claim to be that the right to the presence of counsel extends to 
all psychological evaluations. Mr. Hughes does not allege that the right to the presence 
of counsel extends to pre-trial competency hearings or hearings where a defendant has 
put his mental status at issue. Rather, Mr. Hughes asserts that the right to the presence 
of counsel extends to psychological evaluations that have Fifth Amendment implications 
or are an adversarial hearing. 
The State's reliance on United States v. Trapne/1, 495 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1974), United 
States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1982), In Re Appeal in Maricopa County, 
893 P.2d 60 (Az. App. Div. 1, 1994), People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.Ed. 2d 1055 (Ill. 1995), 
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Cain v. Abramson, 220 S.W. 3d 276 (Ky. 2007), Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85 (Miss. 
2005), Commonwealth v. Banks, 943 A.2d 230 (Pa. 2007), State v. Hardy, 325 S.E. 2d 
320 (S.C. 1985), and State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1997), seems to indicate 
that the State reads Mr. Hughes' claim to be that he is entitled to the presence of 
counsel in all psychological evaluations. Mr. Hughes does not assert this but rather, 
asserts that he is entitled to the presence of counsel in all psychological evaluations 
wherein his Fifth Amendment rights are implicated or that constitute an adversarial 
proceeding wherein he would be required to make strategic or legal decisions. 
All the cases cited by the State hold that a competency evaluation was not a critical 
stage - a significant difference from what the Idaho Supreme court has already held 
regarding a psychosexual evaluation. In addition, the reasons for which the courts held 
the competency hearing was not a critical stage compels the opposite result for 
psychosexual evaluations. For example, the primary bases for the foreign courts to 
hold that the competency evaluation was not a critical stage was because the 
evaluation was not an adversarial proceeding, nor were there any Fifth Amendment 
implications. In contrast, the Idaho Supreme Court held precisely the opposite in 
regards to psychosexual evaluations in Estrada. 
More specifically, all of the cases cited by the State apply either to competency 
hearings, for which Fifth Amendment protections are provided pursuant to court rule or 
statute1, or apply to hearings in which the defendant has placed his mental status at 
issue, and thereby waived his Fifth Amendment right. 
1 Ky.R.Cr. 7.24(B)(ii) ("No statement made by the defendant in the course of any 
examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the 
consent of the defendant, shall be admissible into evidence against the defendant in 
6 
i. In A Case In Which A Defendant Asserts A Mental Status Defense, He 
Puts The Evidence Of His Mental Status At Issue 
A psychosexual evaluation is court-ordered; the defendant has not proffered a 
mental status defense, thereby putting his mental status at issue. However, when a 
defendant does proffer a mental status defense, he has put his mental status at 
issue, and cannot deprive the State of the only method by which it can rebut his 
any criminal proceeding. No testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and 
no fruits of the statement shall be admissible into evidence against the defendant in any 
criminal proceeding except upon an issue regarding mental condition on which the 
defendant has introduced testimony. If the examination ordered under this rule pertains 
to the issue of punishment (excluding a pretrial hearing under KRS 532.135), the court 
shall enter an order prohibiting disclosure to the attorneys for either party of any self-
incriminating information divulged by the defendant until the defendant is found guilty of 
a felony offense ... ") Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice 
9.07, "The court may, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, require the defendant 
examined by a competent psychiatrist selected by the court. No statement made by the 
accused in the course of any examination provided for by this rule shall be admitted in 
evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding."); 
Az.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-4508(A), "The privilege against self-incrimination applies to any 
examination that is ordered by the court pursuant to this chapter." Az. 
Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-4508(8) "any evidence or statement that is obtained during an 
examination is not admissible at any proceeding to· determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence unless the defendant presents evidence that is intended to rebut the 
presumption of insanity;" 725 ILCS 5/104-14(a) "Statements made by the defendant and 
information gathered in the course of any examination or treatment ordered under 
Section 104-13, 104-17 or 104-20 shall not be admissible against the defendant unless 
he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged or intoxicated condition, in 
which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane, 
drugged, or intoxicated."); 50 P.S. § 7402(e)(3) "The person shall be entitled to have 
counsel present with him and shall not be required to answer any questions or to 
perform tests unless he has moved for or agreed to the examination. Nothing said or 
done by such person during the examination may be used as evidence against him in 
any criminal proceedings on any issue other than that of his mental condition.") 
Tenn.R.Crim.P.12.2(c) provides in pertinent part: No statement made by the defendant 
in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be 
with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon 
such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted into evidence 
against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except for impeachment purposes or 
on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced 
testimony. 
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claim. For example, in State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1997), the court was 
asked to determine whether the client waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination when he invoked the insanity defense and whether the client had a 
right to the assistance of counsel during a competency evaluation. Id. at 20-21. 
Therein, the defendant, in response to a charge of first-degree murder, filed notice of 
intent to rely on a mental responsibility defense. Id. at 20. The State then asked for, 
and the court ordered, a mental examination. Id. Following a hearing, the court 
appeared to expand the scope of the evaluation and ordered "Martin to undergo a 
mental evaluation to determine his competency and his mental state at the time of 
the offense." Id. at 21. The court thereafter entered a protective order, holding that 
no statements or fruits of the statements made during the course of the evaluation 
could be introduced at trial "unless and until the issue of mental responsibility is 
raised ... or for impeachment purposes as provided by Rule 12.2(c)." Id. at 22. 
Tenn.R.Crim.P. 12.22 limits the use of the statements made by the defendant and 
effectively provides Fifth Amendment protections to the defendant during the course 
of the evaluation. The Tennessee Court recognized the potential Fifth Amendment 
implications in court-ordered evaluations: 
Preliminarily, we recognize that there are obvious concerns generated 
when a defendant is compelled to undergo a mental examination at which 
he or she will, in all likelihood, discuss not only details of his or her life but 
also information about the charged offense. While numerous federal and 
2 Tenn.R.Crim.P.12.2(c) provides in pertinent part: No statement made by the defendant 
in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be 
with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon 
such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted into evidence 
against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except for impeachment purposes or 
on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced 
testimony. 
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state jurisdictions have confronted these issues, there has been little 
discussion in Tennessee and essentially no detailed analysis of the 
procedures set forth in Rule 12.2. 
Id. The court held that the Tennessee Criminal Rule sufficiently protected the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for any statements, or any 
fruits derived from the statements made during the evaluation. The court further held 
that the information obtained in the evaluation could only be used against the defendant 
if he invoked a mental status defense, such as an insanity defense, for which he waived 
any Fifth Amendment claim to the information. Id. at 25. 
As to the right to counsel, the court held it was not a critical stage because the 
defendant, 
was not confronted by the procedural system; he had no decisions in the 
nature of legal strategy or tactics to make - not even, as we have seen, 
the decision whether to refuse, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer 
the psychiatrist's questions. The only conceivable role for counsel at the 
examination would have been to observe .... 
Id. at 26. 
Similarly, in Trapne/1 and Appeal in Maricopa County, the defendants were 
attempting to raise a mental status defense - in Trapne/1, it was the insanity defense 
(495 F.2d 22 at 24) and in Appeal in Maricopa County it was battered child syndrome. 
(182 Ariz. 60, 64.) In both cases, the courts ruled that when a defendant places his 
mental condition in issue, he waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in that hearing. (495 F.2d 22, 182 Ariz. 60 at 64.) The respective courts 
also held that given the nature of the hearings, they were not critical stages to which the 
right to the assistance of counsel attached. (495 F.2d at 24-25, 182 Ariz. 60 at 64-65.) 
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ii. Competency Evaluations Are Not Analogous To Psychosexual 
Evaluations 
As Idaho clearly holds that "both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for 
purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
applies," and in some circumstances, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel also 
applies, (Estrada, 143 at 563, 149 P.3d at 838), it is curious that the State would cite to 
foreign jurisdictions to hold there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in competency 
hearings when those holdings rest, in part, upon a premise that there is no potential 
Fifth Amendment implications for those hearings, and thus, no reason for Sixth 
Amendment protections. In Cain v. Abramson, for example, Kentucky Criminal 
Procedure Rule 7.24(3)(B)(ii) provides Fifth Amendment protections similar to the 
Tennessee Court rule cited above in Martin, supra. And, like the Tennessee Court, the 
Kentucky Court used the same standard to determine whether the competency 
evaluation constituted a critical stage, and concluded it did not. 220 S.W.3d 276 at 280. 
Additionally, because, unlike psychosexual evaluations, competency evaluations 
do not involve adversarial proceedings, in Hardy, supra, the court found a competency 
evaluation not to be a critical stage because "procedural steps are not taken and no 
events take place that are likely to prejudice the defense. Psychiatric evaluations are 
not adversarial proceedings and defendants are not asked to plead to charges or to 
make statements to be used at trial." Hardy, 325 S.E.2d at 322. 
As recognized in Estrada, a psychosexual evaluation is fraught with the possibility 
that the defendant may provide information that may either provide the basis for 
additional charges or the imposition of a harsher sentence. In a psychosexual 
evaluation, the information sought is "more in-depth and personal, and includes an 
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inquiry into the defendant's sexual history, with verification by polygraph being highly 
recommended," Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. Also, the information has 
the potential of being self-incriminatory, and could include information about the 
charged offense. Id; State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1997), As such, a 
psychosexual evaluation has the potential to "prejudice the defense" and involves a 
defendant making statements to be used against him, 
In contrast, in a competency evaluation, because there is no discussion of the 
current offense, and the defendant is provided Fifth Amendment guarantees, "the 
defendant [is] not confronted by the procedural system; he had no decisions in the 
nature of legal strategy or tactics to make - not even, as we have seen, the decision 
whether to refuse, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer the psychiatrist's questions." 
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 1118-1119 (11 th Cir. 1992). 
Even in the cases cited by the State, the foreign courts recognized their holdings 
would likely be different if the defendant was discussing the charge or other personal 
information. In State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (1997), the Tennessee Supreme Court 
recognized the difference between the kind of information gathered in a competency 
examination and a psychosexual evaluation. While citing this case for the proposition 
that there is no Sixth Amendment rights as applied to a competency evaluation, the 
State failed to cite to the portion of the case wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court 
recognized the potential Fifth Amendment implications in court-ordered evaluations: 
Preliminarily, we recognize that there are obvious concerns generated 
when a defendant is compelled to undergo a mental examination at which 
he or she will, in all likelihood, discuss not only details of his or her life but 
also information about the charged offense. While numerous federal and 
state jurisdictions have confronted these issues, there has been little 
11 
Id. 
discussion in Tennessee and essentially no detailed analysis of the 
procedures set forth in Rule 12.2. 
In Idaho, if any incriminatory information is divulged during a psychosexual 
evaluation, the evaluator must disclose that information or face potential criminal 
liability. See Idaho Code section 16-1619. Thus, a significant distinction between the 
two evaluations is the nature of the Fifth Amendment protection provided. Indeed, it is 
precisely this lack of Fifth Amendment protection that the Estrada court relied upon, in 
part, in finding the psychosexual evaluation to be a critical stage to which Estrada was 
entitled to at least the advice of counsel. Id. at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. 
E. Conclusion 
Based on the above, it appears the State has misunderstood the argument 
made by Mr. Hughes and, as a result, has failed to address the relevant issue, 
i.e. the scope of the right to the assistance of counsel in psychosexual 
evaluations. 
11. 
The State Is Incorrect In Its Assertion That The Suppression Of At Least The Polygraph 
Results. And Maybe The Psychosexual. Would Involve A "Novel Theory" Of Law 
Because. It Claims. Mr. Hughes Was Not Entitled To Miranda Warnings 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hughes asserted two separate Fifth Amendment violations regarding the 
psychosexual evaluation, which included the polygraph examination. He asserted, as 
discussed above, a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He 
also asserted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The State argues that 
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the district court correctly concluded that a motion to suppress either the polygraph or 
the polygraph and the remainder of the psychosexual evaluation would not have been 
successful, and consequently, the attorney did not render ineffective assistance of 
counsel. However, the State has failed to address this issue. 
B. The State Is Incorrect In Its Assertion That The Suppression Of At Least The 
Polygraph Results. And Maybe The Psychosexual. Would Involve A "Novel 
Theory" Of Law Because. It Claims, Mr. Hughes Was Not Entitled To Miranda 
Warnings 
The State argues that the suppression of the polygraph results would have 
involved a "novel theory" of law and, therefore, counsel could not have rendered 
deficient performance for failing to file said motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) 
Second, the State argues that Miranda warnings do not apply to the PSI or the 
psychosexual evaluation and, thus, even if Mr. Hughes did request counsel, that 
request did not have to be honored. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18.) 
i. The State Is Incorrect In Asserting That Suppression Raised A "Novel 
Theory" Of Law 
Contrary to the State's understanding, Mr. Hughes did not argue he was entitled to 
Miranda warnings prior to the psychosexual evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.) 
Mr. Hughes argued that because, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, he requested 
counsel prior to the polygraph, and counsel was not provided, the results of at least the 
polygraph should have been suppressed. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.) He further 
argued that because the unconstitutionally obtained polygraph results were used, in 
part, to provide the basis of the psychosexual evaluation, because the extent to which 
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the polygraph tainted the psychosexual evaluation, the psychosexual should also be 
suppressed. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.) 
The State responds that Mr. Hughes was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to 
undergoing either the psychosexual evaluation or the pre-sentence investigation for two 
reasons. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) First, the State claims, "At the time of sentencing in 
Hughes' underlying criminal case, it was well-established in Idaho law that a defendant 
in a criminal case was not entitled to Miranda warnings before a routine pre-sentence 
investigation or psychosexual evaluation." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) Second, the 
State claims, in essence, that the application of Miranda is limited to circumstances 
where the interrogation is conducted by a police officer. (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-18.) 
These arguments are misplaced. 
ii. The Theory On Which The Polygraph Could Be Suppressed Was Not 
Novel 
The State argues that the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to Miranda 
warnings prior to a polygraph was "well-established." This "well-established" principle is 
supported by citation to two cases. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) However as at least one of 
the cases does not actually provide support for the State's proposition, it would appear 
that "well-established" case law is the citation to one case. 
To the extent the State relies on State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 P.3 1193 
(Ct. App. 2002), to argue that there was "no right to Miranda warnings for psychosexual 
evaluation because it is akin to routine pre-sentence investigations," (Respondent's 
Brief, p.16.) it misstates the holding of Curless. Curless actually held there was no Fifth 
Amendment right because Curless neither asserted it nor was subjected to 
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interrogation. Curless at 143, 44 P.3d at 1199. There was no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel because it did not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings. Id. at 145, 44 
P.3d at 1200. In Curless, the court never reached the issue of whether the Fifth 
Amendment applied to psychosexual evaluations because it found Mr. Curless did not 
assert his Fifth Amendment rights in the evaluation. Id. at 143, 44 P.3d at 1199. The 
court thereafter found that although Mr. Curless was in custody, he was not 
"interrogated" because, 
Id. 
The questioning in this case did not take place in a police station and was 
not conducted by police personnel. Rather, the evaluator who did the 
questioning in the case was a neutral party appointed by the district court 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8316. Based on the circumstances surrounding the 
questioning in this case, we conclude that Curless was not subject to the 
compelling sort of interrogation contemplated in Miranda. 
Thus, the Fifth Amendment issue in Curless was what constituted interrogation -
precisely the issue raised by Mr. Hughes, and an issue that was certainly available for 
argument by trial counsel at the time of Mr. Hughes' sentencing. Moreover, 
Mr. Hughes' trial counsel should have been aware of "well-established" caselaw -
issued by the Idaho Supreme Court - on that issue at that time. At the time of 
Mr. Hughes sentencing, there was clearly established caselaw holding that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to sentencing hearings, there was clearly established caselaw 
holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies to 
psychosexual evaluations in capital cases, there was dicta that indicates the Fifth 
Amendment right would apply to psychosexual evaluations in non-capital cases, and 
there was clearly established caselaw requiring defense attorneys to advocate for their 
clients, which would include arguing reasonable applications of the law. The Miranda 
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warnings are designed as a prophylactic to protect, in part, against violations of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 
(1966). If there is a possibility that a client's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination has been violated, it is a reasonable application of the law, not a "novel 
theory" to argue that in the absence of Miranda warnings, any statements or evidence 
must be suppressed. 
There was certainly sufficient case law for Mr. Hughes' trial attorney to be aware 
that the nature of the interrogation might give rise to a potential Fifth Amendment claim, 
thus, rendering the claim not "novel," but instead, a reasonable application of the 
already-existing caselaw. Additionally, all the relevant case law in holding that the Fifth 
Amendment right applies to court-ordered psychosexual evaluations was all decided 
prior to the case at bar and therefore, was available to Mr. Hughes' trial counsel. See 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding Fifth Amendment privilege applies to 
psychiatric examination during sentencing proceeding in a capital case); Mitchell v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (holding Fifth Amendment privilege applies in a non-
capital sentencing proceeding); Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982) (Fifth 
Amendment privilege attaches in presentence interviews); and State v. Wilkins, 125 
Idaho 215, 868 P.2d 1231 (1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Privilege protects 
against compelled testimony in a non-capital sentencing hearing). Thus, a simple 
review of these cases would have revealed that a reasonable application of the Fifth 
Amendment case law would have been the application of the Fifth Amendment to 
psychosexual evaluations used at sentencing in non-capital cases and for Miranda 
warnings for statements occurring during a custodial interrogation. 
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There is nothing in the record that established Mr. Hughes' trial counsel failed to 
file a motion to suppress based on a strategic choice or a review of the relevant 
caselaw. The State's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal states only, 
"Petitioner fails to present why the 'polygraph should have been suppressed at court', 
so it is not possible to evaluate whether the lack of suppression was ineffective 
assistance of counsel.' (R., p.72.) However, as noted in Appellant's brief, Mr. Hughes 
did articulate at least two different violations of the Fifth Amendment as grounds for 
suppression. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.) Additionally, the state provided no evidence 
that the reason not to file a motion to suppress was strategic. (See, Record, generally). 
In fact, the district court found that Mr. Hughes' trial attorney rendered deficient 
performance regarding the failure to advise Mr. Hughes of his Fifth Amendment rights 
prior to the polygraph. The Court held: 
Assuming arguendo that Hughes was advised by use of the Miranda 
warnings before taking the polygraph, this is insufficient as a matter of law 
to satisfy the requirements of Estrada. The examination given in this case 
required Hughes to respond to more than just the polygraph procedure. 
He was administered psychological testing and questioned thoroughly by 
the examiner. This latter examination clearly implicated his Fifth 
Amendment rights. Because his counsel did not advise him of the rights 
regarding the entire examation, Hughes did not receive the effective 
assistance of counsel and his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. 
(R., p.149.) It appears that had trial counsel done basic legal research, as required by 
Strickland, he would have discovered that his client had a Fifth Amendment right as it 
applied to the psychosexual evaluation. 
Further, as an advocate for his client, Mr. Hughes' trial attorney should have 
made this argument as a reasonable extension of the law. Requiring trial counsel to 
research relevant caselaw and argue a reasonable extension of that caselaw does not 
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"hold defense counsel to an unattainable or impractical standard of legal competence 
and sophistication," but instead, requires the level of competence and advocacy 
articulated in Strickland for the reasonably competent performance by an attorney. See 
United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1003 (8th Cir. 2001). 
Because minimal research would have revealed the above cases and provided a 
basis upon which to move to suppress the evaluation or advise his client not to 
participate in the psychosexual evaluation, and the Record is otherwise silent, this Court 
should find that the reason for not filing a motion to suppress the psychosexual 
evaluation was not based on a knowledge of the relevant cases and as such, his advice 
did not fall within the sound trial strategy and cannot be presumed to fall "within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance" as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 648, 689 (1984). 
The State's reliance on State v. Pizzuto, 119, Idaho 742,759,810 P.2d 680,697 
(1991) does not provide support for the proposition for which it is cited. Although the 
State correctly cites the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court, in federal court, the Ninth 
Circuit held that, "it is now the law of this circuit that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
apply to a presentence interview in preparation for a capital sentencing hearing." 
(Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 
523, 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2001)). First, what Pizzuto objected to was the testimony of the 
individual who had prepared a PSI in an earlier criminal case in the state of Michigan. 
Id.. The court, in analyzing the type of information that could be introduced at 
sentencing, first noted that the admission of reliable hearsay did not violate Pizzuto's 
rights. Id. In analyzing whether the admission of the testimony of the presentence 
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investigator, the court distinguished Mr. Pizzuto's case from both Estelle and Jones, 
holding: 
Unlike the defendant in Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1982), 
Pizzuto made no statements to Berro which incriminated him in any other 
crime. We do not find that Pizzuto's fifth amendment rights were violated 
by the admission of Berro's testimony or by the trial court considering the 
1986 Idaho presentence investigation report in this instant case which 
contains references to the 1975 Michigan report. 
After carefully reviewing the record we hold that the trial court could 
consider the testimony of Berro as well as the contents of the 1986 
presentence investigation report. The record demonstrates that counsel 
for Pizzuto had ample opportunity to examine the report and to explain 
and rebut its contents. We therefore hold that Berra's testimony and the 
1986 presentence investigation report were admissible at Pizzuto's 
sentencing hearing. 
Id., 119 Idaho at 760,810 P.2d at 698 (1991). Thus, of importance to the court was the 
lack of incriminatory statements made by the defendant, a factor which further 
distinguishes the case at bar, and not addressed by the State. Mr. Hughes has 
articulated the incriminatory nature of the statements made (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-26, 
37-38, 77-78) and incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for at least two years prior to 
the sentencing in Mr. Hughes case, there was case law establishing that Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections applied to pre-sentence interviews, thus defeating the State's 
argument. 
iii. The State's Attempt To Limit The Application Of Miranda To 
Circumstances Wherein The Interrogation Is Done By A Police Officer 
Ignores Existing, Contrary Caselaw 
The State claims that "Hughes contends that Miranda warnings are required 
whenever a 'state actor' asks questions of a suspect or defendant in custody." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.17, citing Appellant's Brief, p.35-36.) A careful read of 
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Appellant's Brief reveals no such sweeping proposition. What Mr. Hughes actually 
argued was that because the individual who interrogated Mr. Hughes qualified as a 
state actor for purposes of the Miranda analyses, the polygraph should have been 
suppressed. In essence, the State argues that Miranda warnings can only apply when 
the indvidiual doing the interrogation is a police officer. The State's reliance on Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), for this proposition is misplaced. 
Perkins involved a confession by a defendant to a jail-house informant. Id. at 
295. Mr. Perkins then claimed that the informant was an agent of the state and 
therefore, Mr. Perkins was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by the 
informant about the crime. Id. at 295-296. In holding that no such warnings were 
required, the Court relied on several factors. First, the Court noted, "Conversations 
between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying 
Miranda. The essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion 
are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he 
believes to be a fellow inmate." Id. at 296. Second, the court noted that, "there is no 
empirical basis for the assumption that a suspect speaking to those who he assumes 
are not officers will feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or 
in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess." Id. at 296-297. 
The full context of the citation in Respondent's Brief is: 
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the 
interaction of custody and official interrogation. We reject the argument 
that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody in a 
technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a 
government agent. Questioning by captors, who appear to control the 
suspect's fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court . 
has assumed will weaken the suspect's will, but where a suspect does not 
know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do 
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not exist. The state court here mistakenly assumed that because the 
suspect was in custody, no undercover questioning could take place. 
When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official 
power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by 
the reaction he expects from his listeners. "[W]hen the agent carries 
neither badge nor gun and wears not 'police blue,' but the same prison 
gray" as the suspect, there is no " interplay between police interrogation 
and police custody." Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: 
What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter? 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 67, 63 
(1978). 
Id. at 297. 
The reason that Perkins is inapplicable to the case at bar is that Perkins had no 
idea he was being interrogated by a government agent. In Mr. Hughes' case, not only 
did he realize that he was being interrogated by a government agent, he attempted to 
prevent such interrogation by requesting the presence of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.27-38.) It was precisely the compulsion and his "fear of reprisal" that compelled 
Mr. Hughes to comply with the polygraph. (R., pp.15 (The petitioner initially refused [the 
polygraph] but, he was told if he didn't the judge would 'throw the book at him."').) 
Unlike the defendant in Perkins, Mr. Hughes was well aware of the official power 
exerted over him; it was to that power he succumbed and participated in the polygraph 
examination. (R., pp.15.) The State cannot avoid the application of Miranda by utilizing 
the interrogation services of someone who is there by order of the court, who appears 
"to control the suspect's fate," who exerts "official power over him" but then claim that 
because that individual is not an "officer," Miranda does not apply. 
Moreover, in the case at bar, the district court noted that the "[polygraph] 
examination given in this case required Hughes to respond to more than just the 
polygraph procedure. He was administered psychological testing and questioned 
thoroughly by the examiner. This latter clearly implicated his Fifth Amendment rights." 
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(R., p.150.) Thus, the issue in Mr. Hughes' case was whether the district court erred in 
failing to make any specific factual findings about "whether Mr. Hughes requested 
counsel for the polygraph evaluation and if so, whether the polygraph was obtained in 
violation of that right." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) Unfortunately, the State fails to address 
this issue. 
The State further attempts to argue that the rationale of Miranda and other cases 
do not apply to "interviews conducted by persons who are not police officers and who 
are not gathering evidence with which to bring or pursue criminal charges." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.18.) However, the State fails to recognize the holding and 
analysis of Estrada. Estrada recognized the potential for the gathering of evidence with 
which to bring or pursue criminal charges in a psychosexual evaluation, particularly 
given that the evaluator must report evidence of crime or face potential criminal charges 
himself, as part of the basis for applying Fifth Amendment protections to the 
psychosexual evaluation process. See Idaho Code section 16-1619. 
The additional arguments and authority regarding whether the attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to suppress the psychological 
evaluation because the polygraph was potentially obtained in violation of Mr. Hughes' 
Fifth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is set forth in Appellant's Brief, 
pp.27-41 and need not be re-stated but are incorporated herein by reference. 
iv Conclusion 
Based on the above, Mr. Hughes requests this court find that he was subjected 
to a custodial interrogation, during which his request for counsel was disregarded, and 
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hold that the violation of his Fifth Amendment rights resulted in a tainted psychosexual 
evaluation that should have been suppressed. 
111. 
The State Misunderstands The Distinction Between The Issues Of Asking For A 
Different Evaluation At Sentencing And Obtaining A Confidential Evaluation That Is Not 
Disclosed Prior To Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hughes asserts that his counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to 
protect his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before that right was 
violated by his counsel agreeing to the dissemination of an as-yet-unprepared 
psychosexual evaluation. Although the State would have the court believe otherwise, 
Mr. Hughes does not argue the generalizations that it is ineffective assistance of 
counsel to "ever allow his client to submit to a court-ordered (as opposed to a defense-
controlled) sentencing evaluation," or "that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel 
to allow a defendant to submit to a court-ordered evaluation." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.21.) Rather, Mr. Hughes asserts that counsel renders deficient performance when he 
consents to the release of a psychosexual evaluation sight-unseen. 
B. The State Confuses The Distinction Between The Issues Of Asking For A 
Different Evaluation At Sentencing And Obtaining A Confidential Evaluation That 
Is Not Disclosed Prior To Sentencing 
The State misunderstands the issue raised by Mr. Hughes, which thereafter 
leads to an argument that is flawed. The State argues that the district court was correct 
in dismissing Mr. Hughes' "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly 
failing to move for a psychosexual evaluation performed by an expert of the defense's 
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choosing because counsel had in fact made such a motion, which the court had 
denied," (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) This misperceives the claim made by 
Mr. Hughes. 
Mr. Hughes claims, and argues in Appellant's Brief, that his attorney performed 
below a reasonable standard when he agreed to the participation, release and 
disclosure of the psychosexual evaluation without insuring the confidentiality of that 
evaluation so that Mr. Hughes could review that information prior to that information 
being released to the district court and the State. Mr. Hughes is not challenging his 
attorney's request for an additional evaluation after the first evaluation had already 
been released. To clarify, Mr. Hughes argues that his attorney performed below a 
reasonable standard for failing to insure that the first evaluation was not released to the 
court and the State unless and until Mr. Hughes and his attorney had the opportunity to 
review the evaluation and then determine whether it should be released. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp,79-82.) The State's belief that the "factual predicate of Mr. Hughes' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was disproved," (Appellant's Brief, p.19) only highlights the 
flaw in the State's reasoning. 
Based upon a focus on a later request for a new evaluation, the State alleges, 
"This appears to be an issue raised for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.20, fn.5.) Both propositions are erroneous. First, Mr. Hughes presented this claim in 
his petition. (R, pp.8, 21.) Second, the problems with the evaluation were addressed 
at sentencing. (Tr. 30823, 3/26/2004, p.4, L.22-p.5, L.3) Third, this claim was 
addressed by the district court in denying Mr. Hughes post conviction petition. 
(R, p.143.) It is the denial of this claim by the district court that is being challenged by 
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Mr. Hughes. (Appellant's Brief, pp.79-83.) As such, the issue was addressed in the 
district court and is preserved for review by this court. State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 
514, 518, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267 fn.3 (Ct. App. 2006) (issues presented at the district 
court preserved for appellate review.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Hughes does not claim, that it is ineffective assistance of 
counsel to "ever allow his client to submit to a court-ordered (as opposed to a defense-
controlled) sentencing evaluation." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) Nor does Mr. Hughes 
assert "that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel to allow a defendant to submit 
to a court-ordered evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) 
Instead, what Mr. Hughes actually argues is that his attorney performed below a 
reasonable standard when he agreed to have Mr. Hughes participate in a psychosexual 
evaluation, sight-unseen, and agreed to the release of that document without knowing 
what the document would contain in light of State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 
and Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981). What Mr. Hughes actually argued 
was his attorney, 
should have protected his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
before it was violated. Here, that required trial counsel to first obtain a 
confidential evaluation and then review that evaluation to determine what, 
if any, information should be released to the court and the State. Trial 
counsel should have been aware of the Wood Opinion, as it was issued 
prior to Mr. Hughes' sentencing. As such, trial counsel should have been 
aware that he could not agree to the disclosure of an evaluation whose 
contents were yet unknown. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.81-82.) Mr. Hughes provided additional authority as support for 




In light of the above, Mr. Hughes requests that his court find consistently with the 
argument and authority set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
IV. 
The State's Claim That Mr. Hughes Has Not Established A Prima Facie Claim Of 
Prejudice Ignores The Factual Claims In The Record 
A. Introduction 
Despite its assertions to the contrary, Mr. Hughes has established a prima facie 
claim of prejudice and therefore, is entitled to relief. 
B. The State's Claim That Mr. Hughes Has Not Established A Prima Facie Claim Of 
Prejudice Ignores The Factual Claims In The Record 
The State argues that because Mr. Hughes "never claimed he would not have 
taken the evaluation had he known of his right to refuse and, second, because, as found 
by the district court, Hughes' claims of prejudice are disproved by the record," he has 
not established a prima facie claim of prejudice for his various claims. This argument is 
simply incorrect. 
The State's claim that Mr. Hughes did not assert he would have invoked his right 
to silence and not taken the evaluation" is not supported by the record. In fact, one of 
Mr. Hughes' claims was that he specifically did not wish to take the polygraph and 
wanted counsel present for the examination. (R., pp.15, 116-117.) His desire to forego 
the polygraph was also noted in the Presentence Investigation Report. (PSI, p.31.) 
Moreover, what Mr. Hughes argued was that the evaluation that was prepared should 
never have been disclosed without first being reviewed by him and his attorney so that 
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he would know what to reveal and prepare for sentencing. (R., pp.20-23.) (("The 
petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when 
the defense counsel failed to present the evaluation to the defendant for review in order 
to plan a defense."); (R., p.20.); ("To have only the state appointed psychiatrist is not 
giving the defendant and independent psychiatrist as required in Tuggle.") (R., p.20.); 
('Trial counsel's failure to retain independent psychiatrist in order to present evidence 
during sentencing phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.") (R., p.21.); 
("Denying the defendant the opportunity to discuss optional forms of defense, whether 
claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports findings or 
rebutting the states evidence.") (R., p.21.); ("Rather the functional consequence was to 
limit the defendant to receiving the report of the psychiatrist, a report that was also 
disclosed to the fact finder, while precluding the defendant from receiving the assistance 
off a psychiatrist in interpreting or acting upon the report.") (R., p.22.); ("The petitioner 
was not aware that the evaluation would be sued as part of the PSI report and used 
against him as predictions of future dangerousness.") (R., p.23.) 
Moreover, to establish prejudice, Mr. Hughes has to establish a reasonable 
probability that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
outcome." Id. Mr. Hughes did assert that he did not want to participate in the 
polygraph, which was relied upon by the psychosexual evaluator and used to establish 
future dangerousness for purposes of the psychosexual evaluation, both of which were 
referenced by the pre-sentence investigator, and relied upon by the State to request the 
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imposition of a harsher sentence. (R., p.151-154; Tr. 30823, p.5, Ls.17-21; Tr. 30823, 
3/26/04, p.13, Ls.24-25; Tr. 30823, p.14, Ls.6-8; p.21, Ls.21-24; p.39, Ls.10-20; p.45, 
Ls.12-20; p.43, L.15-p.44, L.1.) 
Mr. Hughes disputes that the sentencing court did not rely on any of the 
detrimental information in the evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-26.) In fact, the 
sentencing court does reference information that came only from the psychosexual 
evaluation as a justification for the sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-26). Further 
arguments in support of Mr. Hughes' claims of prejudice are set forth in the Appellant's 
Brief at pp.17-26, 37-38, 77-78 and incorporated herein by reference. 
C. Conclusion 
Based on the above, Mr. Hughes requests that this court find Mr. Hughes has 
sufficiently articulated the prejudice prong of the Strickland, supra, analysis, such that 
he be granted relief in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hughes respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court 
erroneously dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
be present during a psychosexual evaluation pursuant to both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, because although correctly finding that counsel was not present, it did not 
determine why counsel was not present, and thus remand this case on those issue for 
factual findings, if necessary, in light of the appropriate legal standards. Mr. Hughes 
would also like this Court to find his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
when he failed to file a motion to suppress and the information contained in the 
unconstitutionally-obtained polygraph and when he failed to obtain a confidential, 
independent evaluation and review such evaluation with Mr. Hughes prior to the release 
of that information to the State and the court. Finally, M. Hughes requests that this 
Court articulate the correct test to determine the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
analysis when the district court relied on a PSI and psyschosexual evaluation obtained 
in violation of Mr. Hughes' Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Should 
remand be necessary for factual findings on any of his claims, Mr. Hughes so requests. 
DATED this 24th day of March, 2009. 
fl MOLLY. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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